CORE
Metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk
Provided by Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University

Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University

Research Collection School of Social Sciences | School of Social Sciences

7-2007

# Confucian democracy as pragmatic experiment: Uniting love of learning and love of antiquity

Sor-hoon TAN
*Singapore Management University*, sorhoontan@smu.edu.sg

**DOI:** https://doi.org/10.1080/09552360701445026

Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research

 Part of the Arts and Humanities Commons

Citation
TAN, Sor-hoon.(2007). Confucian democracy as pragmatic experiment: Uniting love of learning and love of antiquity. *Asian Philosophy, 17(2)*, 141-166.
**Available at:** https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/2541

This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Social Sciences at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School of Social Sciences by an authorized administrator of Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.

Published in Asian Philosophy,
Vol. 17 Issue 2, July 2009,
10.1080/09552360701445026
page 141-166

# Confucian Democracy as Pragmatic Experiment: Uniting Love of Learning and Love of Antiquity

Sor-Hoon Tan

*This paper argues for the pragmatic construction of Confucian democracy by showing that Chinese philosophers who wish to see Confucianism flourish again as a positive dimension of Chinese civilization need to approach it pragmatically and democratically, otherwise their love of the past is at the expense of something else Confucius held in equal esteem, love of learning. Chinese philosophers who desire democracy for China would do well to learn from the earlier failures of the iconoclastic Westernizers, and realize that a Chinese democracy cannot come about by ignoring or dismissing such an important part of China's history, its Confucian tradition. The best chances for democracy in China lie in transforming that tradition without destroying it. Eagerness to learn from others must be united with a proper appreciation of one's own past to nurture democracy as a way of life.*

For Chinese intellectuals of the early twentieth century, who were pursuing 'science' and 'democracy' to save China from its internal chaos and external threats, Confucianism was the arch-enemy. Their advocacy of a 'new culture' was often iconoclastic, and Confucians' 'love of antiquity' epitomized for them the stifling traditionalism that had weakened China over the centuries.[1] *Confucian Democracy*: *A Deweyan Reconstruction* (Tan, 2004b) argues that John Dewey's Pragmatism and Confucianism show an affinity in their understanding of the individual, of community, of equality, authority and freedom, so that a Dewey inspired Pragmatist reconstruction of Confucianism offers us a philosophical basis for Confucian democracy, contrary to the anti-democratic historical practices in China that have passed for Confucianism in the past.

Correspondence to: Sor-Hoon Tan, National University of Singapore, Philosophy Department, 3 Arts Link, AS3 #05-17, Singapore 117570. Email: phitansh@nus.edu.sg

This paper takes up the engagement between Dewey's Pragmatism and Confucianism from yet a different angle. Given the rich variety, some would say chaotic fragmentation, of current intellectual discourses in China, specifically in the field of Chinese philosophy, why would Confucian democracy of a Pragmatist kind appeal either to those who wish to 'revive' Confucian traditions or to those who desire democracy for China? I shall argue that Chinese philosophers who wish to see Confucianism flourish again as a positive dimension of Chinese civilization need to approach it pragmatically and democratically, otherwise their love of the past is at the expense of something else Confucius held in equal esteem, the love of learning. Chinese philosophers who desire democracy for China would do well to learn from the earlier failures of iconoclastic Westernizers, and realize that a Chinese democracy cannot come about by ignoring or dismissing such an important part of China's history and culture, its Confucian tradition. The best chances for democracy in China lie in creatively transforming that tradition without destroying it, and in learning judiciously from other traditions. Eagerness to learn from others must be united with a proper appreciation of one's own past to nurture democracy as a way of life.

## China's Democratic Quest: Past Failures and Future Prospects

For nearly two millennia, rulers in China claimed their mandate from heaven; but since the first popular election (1912–1913) of a national government involving only about one eighth of the population, Chinese governments have claimed popular mandate. Yet a government of the people, by the people, for the people remains a dream. China's quest for democracy has been a frustrating tale of broken promises and unfulfilled hope. Within a few years of the establishment of the first Chinese Republic, two attempts were made to restore the monarchy, both involving Confucian conservatives who wanted Confucianism made the State religion. A highly unstable government lurched from crisis to crisis in a country torn by power struggles among war lords and threatened by the imperialistic ambitions of Japan. The May Fourth Movement notwithstanding, democratic participation was meaningless to the vast majority of Chinese people struggling for their very survival. During the Nanjing decade (1928–1938), the Guomindang, under Chiang Kaishek implemented 'tutelary government' (*xunzheng* 訓政); intended by Sun Yat-sen as a transitional stage of one-party rule that prepares the population for democracy, Chiang's application of the doctrine was close to Fascism and failed to usher in democracy.[2] The Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) victory was secured with an impressive popular mobilization; but Mao Tse-tung's promise of a 'New Democracy' brought nothing more than a Leninist 'democratic centralism' that is but another name for totalitarian Communist Party dictatorship.

Reforms under Deng Xiaoping revived hopes for democracy in China. The intellectual ferment of the eighties harks back to the 'Chinese Enlightenment' of the May Fourth period (Li Zehou, 1999, p. 859; Xu Jilin, 1999, p. 257; Yan Jiaqi, 1990, pp. 29–36). Just as the May Fourth promoters of new culture were convinced that a

cultural transformation was required to save China, the very influential television miniseries *The River Elegy*, the centre-piece of the 'culture craze' (*wenhua re* 文化熱) in China which has retrospectively been dubbed the 'new Enlightenment', adopted the same iconoclastic stance towards Chinese traditional culture, despite the import of a New Confucianism arguing for the compatibility of Confucianism and democracy (Su, 1992, pp. 353–423; Xu Jilin, 1999, pp. 8–9, 250–262).[3] The May Fourth Movement provided the symbols and tactics for democracy movements of the eighties. The May Fourth slogans, 'Science' and 'Democracy', appeared on T-shirts in the 1989 demonstrations. However, hopes that reforms would usher in a Chinese democracy any time soon was shaken by the repressive reactions against the Democracy Wall Movement, and then most cruelly dashed when the 1989 Democracy Movement ended in a blood bath around Tiananmen Square, as the People's Liberation Army turned its weapons against the Chinese people.

The CCP survived the world's condemnation of its brutal crushing of the 1989 Democracy Movement. The tenacity of CCP's authoritarian rule notwithstanding, many in and outside China remain convinced that democracy represents the end of history and China can be no exception. However, they disagree over the timing of such transition. Some predict a democracy in China as early as 2010 (Chang, 2001; Starr, 2001). Others expect a successful democratic transition by 2020 (Gilley, 2004, p. 98; Hu Shaohua, 2000, p. 160, fn. 48; Xu Xing, 2002). More cautious commentators place the event some time in the unspecified or distant future (Diamond & Myers, 2000, p. 12; Scalapino, 1998, p. 35; Winckler, 1999, pp. 3–48). The first two groups are probably too optimistic. According to one commentator, 'the democracy movement's moral crusade has been reduced within China to a whisper' within a few years and, frequent localized popular protests notwithstanding, no nation-wide movement demanding democracy comparable to that in 1989 has materialized (Benewick, 1995, p. 6).[4] Even the tenth anniversary of the Democracy Movement, for all the anxieties that marked the year 1999, passed without any significant interruptions to the official celebrations of the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC). The recent death of Zhao Ziyang, a symbol of the hopes and defeat of 1989, no doubt causing the CCP leadership some sleepless nights, passed without any major political upheaval. While many Chinese interviewed by international media acknowledged Zhao as a good leader, when the 1989 Democracy Movement was mentioned, quite a few young Chinese judged those involved as being 'too idealistic'.

Some surveys conducted in the nineties show that, compared with other democratic countries, the mass political culture in the PRC appears sufficient to sustain democracy. However, many believe that 'it is China's elites who will play a crucial role in whether political change takes place in the near future' (Shi Tianjian, 2001, p. 194). Notwithstanding the presence of cultural prerequisites for democracy, among China's elites, there seems to be 'disenchantment with democracy'. The Chinese intellectual scene of the nineties saw the socially engaged, actively pro-democracy humanism of the eighties replaced by a spiritual and moral humanism that focuses on personal integrity. The concern with 'academic norms' appears to some as a retreat into

professional elitism irrelevant to the ordinary people's everyday life and neglecting the democratic responsibility of rational discourse (Xu, 1999, pp. 49–56).[5] Some feel that it is hubris to believe that intellectuals have a mission to 'save China'. Others bemoaned that intellectuals seem to have lost their 'public character'. A 'collective escapism' prevails among many intellectuals (He Yi, 1995; Liu Xiaofeng, 1991, pp. 2–3; Xu Jilin, 1999, pp. 14–18). This political withdrawal in response to the failed bid for democracy and authoritarian reassertion of CCP rule is further reinforced by a turn to professionalism in the 'new national studies' (*xin guoxue* 新國學). Academics and experts increasingly replace intellectuals, who have become marginalized not only economically and politically, but also socially (Xu, 1999, pp. 74–80; Chen Xiaoming, 1997, p. 38; Wang Hui, 2001, p. 162; Xu Jilin, 1999, p. 12).

The important differences underlying the common platform of attitudes and approaches of the 1980s, which viewed China's problems mostly in terms of a tradition-modernity contrast, with the West providing the model for China's modernization, surfaced as major intellectual divisions in the 1990s (Xu Jilin, 1999, pp. 257–262). Deeper knowledge of the ideas and theories accepted during the eighties as well as new ideas and theories provided multiple perspectives on the increasingly complex problems of reforms. Support for democracy became more qualified as debates arose over the relative merits of radicalism and conservatism, the meaning and relevance of liberalism, and the malaise of modernity. The meaning of democracy has become more explicitly contested rather than merely taken for granted. Post-Tiananmen Chinese discourses are very much concerned with stability and finding a 'third way' for China's modernization between capitalism and Marxism-Leninism. Among those who still believe that democracy should have a place in China's future, fewer take for granted that Chinese democracy must be a form of liberal democracy similar to existing Western democratic polities. Many believe that learning from the West must be combined with an appreciation of China's unique situation. This unique situation includes China's cultural and philosophical traditions, among which Confucianism is arguably the most important.

## Recovering Tradition: Will It Obstruct Democratization?

What role does Confucianism play in discussions about democracy and China's future? May Fourth intellectuals thought that demolishing Confucianism and transforming China's culture will bring about democracy. One might then conclude that the lack of democracy in China is due to Chinese culture remaining Confucian.[6] Should those who want democracy work harder to eradicate Confucianism? Those who believe Confucianism has been dealt a severe if not a death blow without democracy materializing in China may insist that Confucianism was not the only obstacle to democracy in China, and many prerequisites, cultural or otherwise, for democracy remain missing or inadequate. Still, inheritors of May Fourth's anti-Confucian attitudes will see any revival of Confucianism as bad news for democratization. This view is not uncommon given the long association between

autocratic government and Confucian state orthodoxy in imperial China. Furthermore, attempts to obstruct or destroy whatever little democratic gains China had seen in the last century have often solicited the help of Confucianism: from attempts to restore the monarchy in the early Chinese Republic to Chiang Kaishek's mixing of Fascism with Confucianism in his one-party rule (Wakeman, 1997), to the recent CCP leaders' promotion of Confucianism as a bulwark against Western values of liberal democracy.

May Fourth attitudes to Confucianism had influenced a whole generation of Chinese, including Mao Tse-tung. In an attack on Liang Shuming, whom Guy Alitto called 'the last Confucian', Mao criticized Confucius for being 'undemocratic' (Ma Zhenduo, Xu Yuanhe, & Zheng Jiadong, 1999, p. 363). During the Cultural Revolution, Confucianism was identified with feudal society and vehemently attacked. With the 'liberation of thought' brought by Deng's reforms, calls for re-evaluation of Confucianism, beginning with an article in the *Guangming Daily* (Pang Pu, 1978, p. 2), came from different quarters with increasing frequency. By the mid-eighties, the study of Confucianism shifted from re-evaluation to democratic reconstruction (Song Xianlin, 2003, p. 85; Song Zhongfu, 1991, p. 356). There was renewed interest in the works of twentieth-century Chinese philosophers who have asserted the centrality of Confucianism in Chinese traditional culture, some of whom have attempted democratic reinterpretation or reconstruction of Confucian tradition and culture in their encounter with Western democratic thought (Chang, Mou Zongsan, Tang Junyi, & Xu Fuguan, 1958; Tu Wei-ming, 1986, pp. 3–21). Scholars of Confucianism who advocated the compatibility of Confucianism and liberal democracy, such as Tu Wei-ming, were invited to China on lecture tours. Not all Chinese participants in the 1980s Confucian discourse welcomed the revival of Confucianism. Many continue to see Confucianism as a tradition that is obsolete, an obstacle to modernization, particularly to democratization (Bao Zunxing, 1988a, p. 64; 1988b; Gan Yang, 1986; Gao Xuguang, 1988; Liu Xiaobo, 1988, pp. 89–90; Zhu Riyao, Cao Deben, & Sun Xiaochun, 1987, p. 16). The revival of Confucianism in the PRC and resistance to it were different responses to the perceived dilemma of learning from the West and preserving 'Chinese culture', brought by the Open Door policies of the reform era, which resulted in the 'culture craze' of the 1980s. According to Song Xianlin's recent study, 'the newly created ''Confucian discourse'' helped to reconstruct and re-imagine the Confucian ideal in post-Mao Chinese society, later serving as a catalyst for the ''national studies craze'' (*guoxue re* 國學熱) of the 1990s' (2003, p. 81).

Reflecting on the 1989 Democracy Movement, some intellectuals associated with the journal *Xueren* (*The Scholar*) found that the New Enlightenment intellectuals, who exercised great influence on the participants of the movement, knew or cared very little about Chinese history (Wang Hui, 2003, pp. 59–60). The resulting emphasis on China's historical context and its relation with current Chinese realities, and the importance of both for charting China's future, gives rise to a new interest in pre-twentieth century Chinese literature, history and philosophy—subjects grouped together as *guoxue* (national studies). A broad range of intellectuals,

neo-conservatives, neo-nationalists, but also new left intellectuals and postmodernists, share this new interest in Chinese traditions. Even liberals, who usually criticized traditional culture for lacking science and democracy, started arguing that a Chinese philosophy 'purified' by the encounter with the West is highly compatible with the latest scientific paradigms, and that a nation that fails to find the roots of modernization in its own cultural traditions cannot modernize successfully (Li Shenzhi, 1992). The 'national studies craze' is more than an academic interest in the past. Following Sheng Hong's (1993) attempt to find parallels between pre-Qin Chinese thought and Western economic thought, including private property and the role of institutions, a steady stream of articles appeared in various journals exploring the relation between Confucianism and contemporary economics, management, environmental issues, sports, education, even law enforcement.[7] Besides the relevance of Confucian ideas to specific areas or practice, its general compatibility with modernization and democracy also received considerable attention.[8] An interest in traditional culture and thought need not be conservative or anti-democratic and a more balanced approach to East–West comparison could be more productive than one based on a romanticized view of the West.

The danger of this renewed interest in tradition lies in going to the other extreme of romanticizing traditional Chinese culture itself and refusing to acknowledge that there are valuable things to be learned from other cultures. Some scholars who have long devoted themselves to the study of Chinese traditional culture worry about 'national studies' being appropriated as an ideology and falling into narrow nationalism; they insist that the only way for Chinese culture to flourish again is for the 'true spirit' of Chinese culture to connect with contemporary demands, and with the developing trends of world culture (Tang Yijie, 1995). However, given the tendency to conceive Chinese and Western cultures as antitheses, critics have good reason to associate the interest in 'national studies' with unhealthy anti-Western nationalism and conservative political outlook (Chen Xiaoming, 1997, p. 36).

The 'return to traditional culture', linked to the rise of neoconservatism-neoauthoritarianism in China, is part of a wave of 'Asian exceptionalism' in the 1990s. In the 1980s, the impressive economic achievement of the four 'little dragons' in Asia—South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore—generated a discussion about a possible Asian model of development, suggesting that their common Confucian culture was largely responsible for the economic success of these countries (Berger & Hsiao, 1988; Kahn, 1979, pp. 121–123, 329–383).[9] China and other countries in and out of Asia turned to Asian models, as alternatives or complements to Western models, in search of development strategies that would avoid the problems in the West and preserve the best of their own cultural traditions (Bell, 1995, p. 34).[10] Arguments about the differences between Asian values and Western values have been deployed against ideas such as democracy, individual autonomy, and human rights—or at least against the hegemony of Western conceptions of these ideas.[11] Some Western scholars join Asian officials and academics in resisting imposition of Western standards as universal norms. Others take a more moderate position and argue that greater political participation and freedom of expression in

undemocratic illiberal Asian societies would depend in part on 'agreement that human rights should not be understood or defined solely in Western terms; rather, they are a growing, expandable concept that will be enhanced through shared multicultural learning and experience', while Asian scholars such as Onuma Yasuaki (1996) called for 'intercivilizational' human rights (see also de Bary, 1998, p. 54; Li Tieying, 2001).

To what extent could democracy and other related ideas of liberty, equality, or rights be generated from Chinese culture? Are they even compatible? Lucian Pye considers Confucian political culture authoritarian and an obstacle to the democratization in Asia (1985, pp. 55–89). Samuel Huntington goes so far as to call Confucian democracy 'a contradiction in terms' (1996, p. 21). On this reading, Confucian societies, such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, succeeded in their democratization *despite* Confucianism; in becoming democratic, they become less Confucian. In contrast, Wm. Theodore de Bary (1983) and Tu Wei-ming (1986) interpret Confucian philosophy as humanistic and liberal. Tu (1984, p. 90) and Yu Ying-shih (1997, p. 208) defend the Confucian way of life while rejecting its political baggage. Between the extremes of interpreting Confucianism as a humanism with liberal democratic tendencies and insisting that Confucianism is feudal and inherently authoritarian, Hu Shaohua recently argues that Confucianism is neither democratic in itself nor an insurmountable obstacle to democratization (2000, pp. 23–26).

Some comparisons of Confucian values with democratic values emphasize their significant differences. Liu Shu-hsien (1992) insists that Confucianism must surrender some components and radically transform others to accommodate democracy. There are also scholars who maintain that the values of Confucianism and liberal democracy are inherently incompatible. On this basis, Chenyang Li (1999, chap. 7) argues for coexistence of both set of values in China's future, while Henry Rosemont (1998) uses these differences to criticize Western liberal democracy. Those who reject Confucian democracy usually adopt the liberal conception of democracy and interpret Confucianism as inherently collectivistic, patriarchal, and authoritarian. However, democracy is a contested concept in Western philosophical discourses, just as Confucianism is not a homogeneous tradition. Those who believe that Confucianism has no place for liberal individual autonomy may nevertheless see Confucianism as compatible with a democracy that adopts a social conception of the individual, such as that found in John Dewey's philosophy. Roger Ames and David Hall have argued that Dewey's 'communitarian' conception of democracy is the best bridge between China's Confucian civilization and a democratic future (Hall & Ames, 1999). I agree with them regarding the appeal of Deweyan democracy for Confucians in this regard, although as a Deweyan Pragmatist, I would resist any dualistic divide between liberalism and communitarianism.

There is no end in sight to the debates about the compatibility of Confucianism and democracy. As long as China does not democratize, its Confucian legacy will always be suspected of being one of the obstacles if not the primary obstacle. No doubt if the PRC becomes a democracy, people will argue over whether it is still

Confucian, and whether Confucianism enhances or detracts from the resulting Chinese democracy. For those who are interested in China becoming democratic but remaining Confucian in some ways, it is vital to persuade those with a stake and who could do something about China's future that Confucianism in the new millennium can and should be democratic. In the rest of this paper, I extend the argument for Confucian democracy by showing that it may be seen as a pragmatic experiment that unites Confucian love of learning with Confucian love of antiquity. In the remaining sections, I shall present passages from the *Analects* that illustrate the importance of both love of learning and love of antiquity, with the former relatively more important than the latter, and then proceed to show, through what may be called a creatively transformative reading of relevant passages in the text, how a pragmatic democracy is well suited to unite these twin loves in the *Analects*.

## Twin Loves in the *Analects*: *Haoxue* (好學) and *Haogu* (好古)

It is widely recognized that Confucian societies value education very highly. To the Chinese, Confucius is the 'model teacher of ten thousand generations' (*wanshi shibiao* 萬世師表). The *Analects* begins with a passage about the delight of practicing what one has learned, and the topic of learning continues throughout the text. The text itself is not only a record of what Confucius' students had learned from him, but also contains Confucian views about the nature and the importance of learning. Learning has more than instrumental value, it is a goal in life that merits commitment and love. Confucius described the key stages of his life by beginning with his 'setting his heart-mind upon learning from fifteen'.[12] He urged his students to 'make an earnest commitment to the love of learning (*haoxue*) and be steadfast to the death in service to the efficacious way (*shandao* 善道)' (*Analects* 8.13). A 'refined' or 'cultured' person, one who may be described as *wen*[a] (文), is a person who loves learning (*Analects* 5.5). The love of learning also characterizes the exemplary person (*Analects* 1.14).

Among the reasons Yan Hui stood out among Confucius' students is his true love of learning, which Confucius did not encounter in others (*Analects* 6.3, 11.7). Love of learning in the *Analects* does not mean a mere attraction to learning. Human beings begin learning from birth and probably learned the most things at the greatest speed without any deliberate effort during the first few years of their lives. This inclination to learn may fade as one settles into the routine of habits accumulated over time. However, mere liking for learning cannot be as rare as Confucius made it out to be. What is rare is the kind of love for learning that means treating learning as a first priority, putting forth untiring efforts without ceasing, and being prepared to pay a high price in terms of worldly goods for the sake of that commitment to learning, and at the same time finding delight in the experience rather than suffering and bemoaning the price of learning. Those who can be said to have a love of learning 'do not look for a full stomach in eating, nor comfort and contentment in their lodgings' (*Analects* 1.14). Yan Hui, with his great love for learning, was probably with good

reason the most impoverished among Confucius' students, yet poverty had no effect on his enjoyment of learning and practicing the Confucian way of excellence.

> The Master said, 'A person of character (*xian* 賢) is this Yan Hui! He has a bamboo bowl of rice to eat, a gourd of water to drink, and a dirty little hovel in which to live. Other people would not be able to endure his hardships, yet for Hui it has no effect on his enjoyment. A person of character is this Yan Hui! (*Analects* 6.11)

It is such exceptional love for learning that is rare, and for which Confucius also prided himself on having.

> The Master said, 'There are, in a town of ten households, bound to be people who are as good as I am in doing their utmost (*zhong* 忠) and in making good on their word (*xin* 信), but there will be no one who can compare with me in the love of learning (*haoxue*).' (*Analects* 5.28)

Confucius seemed to value the love of learning above *zhong* and *xin*, as the former appears to be rarer and probably more difficult to attain. This is significant as *zhong* and *xin* are two of the four categories of Confucius' teachings (*Analects* 7.25); they are important virtues of exemplary persons. On one occasion, Confucius recommended that his students 'take *zhongxin* (忠信) as their mainstay' (*Analects* 1.8). On another occasion, he pointed out that to take *zhongxin* as one's mainstay is 'to accumulate excellence' (*chongde* 崇德) (*Analects* 12.10). Confucius' student Master Zeng examined himself thrice everyday with regard to *zhong* and *xin* (*Analects* 1.4). The same student clarified for others that 'the one thread that binds together the Master's way' is none other than *zhong* and *shu* 恕, 'doing one's utmost and putting oneself in the other's place' (*Analects* 4.15). Yet Confucius prided himself on the fact that others could match him on *zhong* and *xin* more easily than they could equal him in the love of learning.

Not only does this imply that virtues of *zhong* and *xin* are not as important as the love of learning, Confucius explicitly explained to Zilu, a man of action and probably the least fond of learning among Confucius' students, that virtues, including the primary Confucian virtue of *ren* 仁, become flawed in the absence of love of learning.[13]

> The flaw in being fond of acting authoritatively (*ren*) without equal regard for learning is that you will be easily duped; the flaw in being fond of acting wisely (*zhi*[a] 知) without equal regard for learning is that it leads to self-indulgence; the flaw in being fond of making good on one's word (*xin*) without equal regard for learning is that it leads one into harm's way; the flaw in being fond of candor (*zhi*[b] 直) without equal regard for learning is that it leads to rudeness; the flaw in being fond of boldness (*yong* 勇) without equal regard for learning is that it leads to unruliness; the flaw in being fond of firmness (*gang* 剛) without equal regard for learning is that it leads to rashness. (*Analects* 17.8)

Besides his love of learning, Confucius is also well known for his love of antiquity (*haogu*), although Confucius discussed the former more frequently than the latter with his students. He compared himself to the 'venerable Old Peng' in the confidence with which he loved antiquity. Confucius linked 'love of antiquity' with his love of learning.

> The Master, 'I was not born with knowledge but, being fond of antiquity, I was quick to seek it.' (*Analects* 7.20, Lau's translation)

While those born with knowledge are the most superior, most people acquire knowledge through learning; Confucius was contemptuous of those who made no effort to learn even when vexed with difficulties (*Analects* 16.9). It is ambiguous whether Confucius sought knowledge about antiquity because of his love for it, or his love for antiquity enabled him to be quick in seeking knowledge. It is very likely that both meanings are present. Confucius loved antiquity because he could learn from it; he loved learning because it connected him to the antiquity which he loved. The love of learning and the love of antiquity are interdependent and mutually enhancing. Antiquity represents a rich reservoir of knowledge for Confucius. Many of the passages mentioning antiquity (*gu*) are about learning from past examples (*Analects* 3.16, 4.22 among others).

The tendency to read Confucius as a conservative traditionalist, who is against all innovation, often leads to the erroneous conclusion that Confucius' love of learning is primarily if not exclusively for learning from antiquity. The reading that views Confucius as a conservative traditionalist finds considerable support in *Analects* 7.1, in which Confucius spoke of his love for antiquity after claiming that he 'transmitted but did not create (*shu er bu zuo* 述而不作)' (Chan, 1963, p. 31).[14] Furthermore, Confucius often compared contemporary behaviour unfavourably with that of ancient times, such as observing that, 'Scholars of old would study for their own sake, while those of today do so to impress others' (*Analects* 14.24, see also 17.16). Confucius especially admired the cultural achievements of the Zhou dynasty and claimed to 'follow Zhou' (*Analects* 3.14). Not surprisingly, Confucius has been seen as someone who looked back towards a lost golden age, and was committed to restoring the crumbling social and political order of the Zhou dynasty (Graham, 1986, p. 4; Li Zehou, 1996, p. 7).[15] This view is compounded historically by increasingly uncreative and rigidly conservative interpretation and application of the Master's teachings once Confucianism became state orthodoxy and Confucius was elevated to the status of a sage. Learning became reduced to learning from antiquity. Even when they create new knowledge and understanding, when they innovate, Confucian scholars traditionally presented their works as learning from the sages of antiquity, especially Confucius. The traditionalist turn explains the attempts to pass off one's work as discovered 'ancient texts', and the strength of the commentarial tradition versus the undervalued claims of original authorship.

Given the historical development of the tradition, it is not surprising that critics of traditional Confucianism often view Confucian education as rote learning involving mainly memorizing of obsolete texts, which are out of step with modernization, and blame it for unthinking devotion to antiquity which stands in the way of progress. However, I would argue that such traditionalism that stifles creativity and reduces learning to learning from antiquity is a contingent development based on a biased reading of the *Analects*. A close scrutiny of the text, without presupposing that learning for Confucius is always learning from antiquity, reveals that the love of

learning is mentioned more frequently than the love of antiquity, and the mentions of learning refer more often to other (or unspecified) forms of learning than to learning about or from antiquity. Had Confucius adopted a narrow view of learning as learning from antiquity, he would be guilty of an inadequate understanding of learning even for his time. His quest of personal cultivation and bringing about better government, to realize the way in his world could not be achieved with learning that is confined to learning from the past. I contend that the evidence in the *Analects* shows that Confucius has a much broader understanding of learning that renders it much more useful to contemporary Confucians.

## Pragmatic Experiment in Uniting Love of Learning and Love of Antiquity

The traditionalist conservative reading of Confucius' teachings turns its back on Confucius' love of learning, and fails to appreciate the importance of learning in acquiring *zhi*[a] and the pragmatic nature of *zhi*[a] in the Confucian way.[16] Confucius taught his students the importance of learning from the problems encountered and not repeating one's mistakes (*Analects* 1.8, 9.25, 15.30, 16.9). The unsatisfactory results of practicing Confucianism as rigid traditionalism and authoritarian political orthodoxy should encourage modern Confucians to interpret and embody Confucius' teachings differently. I shall show that remaining true to Confucius love of learning while not surrendering his love of antiquity in today's world requires a democratic understanding of Confucianism, rather than a revival of conservative traditionalism. In this democratic understanding, Confucian democracy is a pragmatic experiment. According to Dewey's pragmatic conception, democracy is a way of life that employs the method of organized intelligence in 'the greatest experiment of humanity—that of living together in ways in which the life of each of us is at once profitable in the deepest sense of the word, profitable to himself and helpful in the building up of the individuality of others' (Dewey, 1938, p. 303). I suggest that one such experiment is the Confucian practice of *ren*, which involves participating in a community where members 'establish others in seeking to establish themselves, and promote others in seeking to get there themselves' (*Analects* 6.30).

In Dewey's pragmatic conception, democracy is a way of life that replaces violence as a means to settle disagreements and differences in social life with mutual learning and intelligence in social inquiry. As a Pragmatist, Dewey views all ideas as tools for solving actual problems human beings encounter; democracy is one such idea. It solves the problem that Immanuel Kant calls 'the unsocial sociability of men, that is, their tendency to come together in society, coupled, however, with a continual resistance which constantly threatens to break this society up' (Reiss, 1991, p. 45). Dewey does not share Kant's conception of human beings as autonomous individuals; for him, human individuals are social beings (Dewey, 1891, p. 335; 1912–1913).[17] However, he would agree with Kant about the inherent tensions of social life because of the diversity of personalities, beliefs, desires, interests, and so on among individuals and groups sharing a common space. To successfully share that

space without coming to blows, members of a group would need to hold things in common, that is, they have to become a community, where differences and disagreements are resolved through communication and intelligence rather than violence (Dewey, 1939b, p. 228).

Dewey's substitution of intelligence for reason as the key concept for understanding the thinking involved in democratic life is more conducive to Confucian thought than other democratic theories infected by dualisms of body and mind, of reason and emotion. Intelligence in Dewey's philosophy 'is not the faculty of intellect honored in textbooks and neglected elsewhere, but which is the sum-total of impulses, habits, emotions, records, and discoveries which forecast what is desirable and undesirable in future possibilities, and which contrive ingeniously in behalf of imagined good' (Dewey, 1917, p. 48). Of Western models, pragmatic democracy is most useful to Confucian communities because it is not about universal absolute ideals that ignore cultural particularities. Pragmatists construct true social ideals by 'extract[ing] the desirable traits or forms of community life which actually exist, and employ[ing] them to criticize undesirable features and suggest improvement' (Dewey, 1916a, p. 89). Such ideals direct our actions; they are 'generated through imagination, but not made out of imaginary stuff' (Dewey, 1934a, p. 33). As a pragmatic experiment, Confucian democracy could and would have to develop its own culturally particular forms of democratic practice by drawing on the actual experience of Confucian societies including their traditions; it is a pragmatic democracy in so far as its community life is one that fosters the growth of all members and employs the method of experimental intelligence in solving the problems of common life. Its members resolve problems through social inquiry with free and equal participation, where freedom means 'the power to secure release and fulfillment of personal potentialities which take place only in rich and manifold association with others', and equality 'the unhampered share which individual member of the community has in the consequences of associated action' (Dewey, 1927, p. 329).

A Deweyan would persuade a Confucian to accept pragmatic democracy by arguing that Confucius' love of learning could only be satisfied in such a community. As a pragmatic experiment, democracy is the most educative of community life. It makes the best use of the resources accumulated in the past for living well in the present and creating a better future. For Dewey, a democratic community is one that solves the problems of common life through a process of social inquiry, which aims to be both educative and intelligent. Democratic life is educative because the ethical ideal of democracy 'is not satisfied merely when all men sound the note of harmony with the highest social good, so be it that they have not worked it out for themselves' (Dewey, 1888, p. 243). In this insight into the ethical end of human growth, pragmatic understanding of democratic life chimes in with the Confucian belief that the building of community requires the embodiment of *ren* in oneself (*Analects* 12.1, 14.42) and personal cultivation requires learning by oneself and for oneself in a community (*Analects* 14.24).[18] The democratic method is that of intelligence because it uses past experiences to meet new experiences, so as to improve the present and

shape a better future. The intelligence involved is 'a pooled and coordinated social intelligence, not the mere scattered individualized intelligences of persons here and there, however high their IQs may be' (Dewey, 1920, p. 134; 1939a, p. 320). Social intelligence emerges in the give and take of cooperative inquiry, it is a product of communication among the participants and an embodiment of 'the rich store of the accumulated wealth of mankind in knowledge, ideas and purposes' that the participants are able to draw upon (Dewey, 1935, pp. 38, 48; 1927, p. 366). Such a community unites Confucian love of learning and love of antiquity in its way of life.

One should perhaps pause before equating Dewey's 'the rich store of accumulated wealth of mankind in knowledge, ideas and purposes' with antiquity. Dewey seldom mentioned 'antiquity' and on a few occasions made disparaging remarks about education that is based on 'antiquity', which in the Western context refers to ancient Greek and Roman culture. If 'antiquity' is perceived as 'the supposed body of ready-made knowledge upon which learned men rested in supine acquiescence and which they recited in parrot-like chorus' (Dewey, 1920, p. 99), then it becomes an obstacle to intelligent inquiry. Some traditionalist readings of Confucianism fall into a similar attitude to Chinese antiquity. However, if we keep in mind that Confucius admired antiquity because he believed that the world was a better place in those times, and he wished to learn from antiquity to improve the world he lived in, then we are not talking about the 'musty antiquity' of the scholastics; we would then be quite justified in seeing the 'antiquity' Confucius loved and learned from as the Chinese equivalent to Dewey's 'the rich store of accumulated wealth of mankind in knowledge, ideas and purposes', which are instruments for improving the world we now live in.

Dewey usually associated intelligence with the scientific method. It would be anachronistic to attribute any concern with scientific knowledge to Confucius. Could Confucian understanding of learning really accommodate 'creative intelligence', which sums up 'the pragmatic attitude'? Dewey was not guilty of scientism in the sense of reducing everything to science, or dismissing anything that lies outside science.[19] By 'scientific method' he meant a generalized mode of thinking rather than specialized techniques. The primary implications of adopting the scientific method in education is a recognition that we learn from experience, from personally engaging subject matter in experiments; and experiments do not occur only in science laboratories but include any activity that systematically connect what we do with what we undergo, connect actions and their consequences. The understanding of the connections between events and actions on the one hand, and their consequences in specific circumstances on the other, enables us to direct future events through actions, although we can never establish complete control because of the contingency and uncertainty that pervade human existence in its full complexity. Connecting events and actions with consequences gives them additional meaning while success in directing future events for satisfying results, that is, resolving problematic situations, creates value. For Dewey, education is a reconstruction or reorganization of experience that achieves meaning and value; the meaning and value of human experience go beyond science. The 'accumulated wealth of mankind in knowledge,

ideas and purposes' he wished to make more accessible to all so that they may conduct their lives more intelligently and thereby more democratically refers to the cultural legacies of human achievements in both art and science.[20]

Instead of affirming the scientistic claim that science is omnipotent, Dewey lamented that, 'Modern preoccupation with science and with industry based on science has been disastrous' (Dewey, 1926a, p. 112). In promoting the scientific method, his understanding of science departs radically from the narrowly rationalistic assumptions that underlie scientism. He insisted that science 'must be seen and placed as one mode of human concern and occupation connected both in source and in outcome, with all other human interests and undertakings.' For Dewey, science is 'the convergence to a focus of human activities that bear the names of art, politics, law, economics, and even of such things as are sport and recreation', but it cannot replace any of these other realms of human achievements (Dewey, 1949, p. 366). Science cannot even realize its full value in human affairs until we also recognize the place of art in living a free, full and enriched life. Despite their technical and specialized differences, science and art are fundamentally united as complementary phases of human experience, different ways of responding to the need of the human organism to attain relationships of equilibrium with its environments. Neither is purely intellectual, cognitive, or affective. They both involve 'practical adjustments' in 'bringing about a new relationship between organisms and the conditions of life, and like other phases of the function is controlled by need, desire and progressive satisfactions' (Dewey, 1926b, p. 106). Science and art are both intelligent forms of conduct. Art is not inferior to science in its educative import and is arguably more fundamental in Dewey's philosophy of experience.

> The doings and sufferings that form experience are, in the degree in which experience is intelligent or charged with meanings, a union of the precarious, novel, irregular with the settled, assured and uniform—a union which also defines the artistic and esthetic. (Dewey, 1925, p. 269)

There is no inherent problem of scientism to prevent Deweyan pragmatic democracy from being adapted for use by Confucians. There is no unbridgeable gulf between Dewey's Pragmatism and Confucianism because intelligent conduct for Dewey goes beyond science to embrace the rest of humanity's cultural achievements while Confucius' idea of learning is more than just learning about antiquity for its own sake. On the part of modern Confucians, there is nothing in Confucius' teachings that requires them to reject science and technology in the role Dewey assigned these aspects of civilization. Insofar as these could contribute to people's general well-being, the Confucian concern with 'being broadly generous with the people and being able to help the multitude' (*Analects* 6.30) should dispose them favourably toward science. Confucius' insistence that one should not be inflexible in learning provides support for modern Confucians to be open-minded about the subject-matter of education (*Analects* 1.8, 9.4, 14.32). Certainly a proposal to reintroduce the ancient curriculum of the 'six arts' (*liuyi* 六藝) of Confucius' time is too impractical to help the cause of a meaningful revival of Confucianism.

Although there is recently something of a fad in reintroducing classical Chinese texts to school children in some Asian societies, this is in the form of 'enrichment' rather than replacing the modern education curricula which are heavily biased towards the sciences. While modern Confucians need to adapt themselves to scientific inquiry, the bias that Dewey deemed disastrous could perhaps be moderated by the Confucian tradition of comprehensive aesthetic education, wherein knowledge is very much a holistic practice, which avoids the divisions of intellectual, affective and practical that troubled the Western traditions Dewey criticized. The aesthetic element in Confucian education, clearly highlighted by the emphasis on the joy of learning, the importance Confucius assigned to the songs (*shi* 詩), rites (*li* 禮), and music (樂), fits into Dewey's pragmatic understanding of learning and knowledge that recognizes both science and art as intelligent activities.[21]

For pragmatic democracy to unite Confucian love of learning and love of antiquity, it is important to recognize that the latter does not limit Confucians to learning about ancient ideas and practices for their own sake, or slavish imitation of the ancients. Confucius praised Zigong not for being merely able to quote from the ancient text, the *Songs*, but for his understanding which demonstrates that, 'on the basis of what has been said, he knew what is yet to come' (*Analects* 1.15).

> The master said, 'Reviewing the old as a means of realizing the new (*wengu er zhixin* 溫故而知新)—such a person can be considered a teacher.' (Analects 2.11)

Reading *zhixin* (知新) pragmatically, as this translation does, the passage indicates that, in learning about antiquity, one connects it to what is new so that one could use resources from the past to transform the present and shape the future. Such a view of education exemplifies Dewey's method of intelligence: the use of past experiences to meet the needs of new experiences in order to reorganize experience for better outcomes. If we read *zhixin* in terms of non-pragmatic epistemology, one might understand this passage as implying that certain aspects of reality, of what can be known, remains unchanged, and it is because what is true of the old is still true of the new that reviewing the old enables one to know the new. However, I contend that this is a less persuasive reading because if the crux of the matter in learning/teaching is grasping what remains unchanged, why contrast the old with the new, why not 'review the past as a means of knowing the present or future' instead? The contrast between old and new emphasizes change. The challenge of teaching and, by implication, of learning as well, is to make what is old serviceable in new situations, a challenge directly addressed by the pragmatic concept of intelligence (Dewey, 1926c).

A pragmatic reading also fits several other passages in the *Analects* on *zhi*[a] and *xue*(學). Those who are described as *zhi*[a] 'are active' (*Analects* 6.23), for knowledge is not purely intellectual, but is a form of practice. One looks to a person's practice to determine if he 'knows the rites' (*zhili* 知禮) (*Analects* 3.22, 7.31). A person who is *zhi*[a] 'devotes himself to what is appropriate for the people and shows respect for the ghosts and spirits while keeping them at a distance' (*Analects* 6.22). Confucius responded to a request to explain the meaning of 'knowing people' (*zhiren* 知人) in terms of the action one should take: 'Raise the straight and set them over

the crooked. This can make the crooked straight' (*Analects* 12.22, Lau's translation). Whether one has learned is determined by practice.

> Zixia said: 'As for persons who care for character much more than beauty, who in serving their parents are able to exert themselves utterly, who gave their whole person in the service of their rule, and who, in interactions with colleagues and friends, make good on their word (*xin*)—even if it were said of such persons that they are unschooled, I would insist that they are well educated (*xue*) indeed.' (*Analects* 1.7)

It is not intellectual learning that gives delight, but learning that is practiced at appropriate times (*Analects* 1.1). What recommends 'learning the way' (*xuedao* 學道) to everyone is its practical consequences: 'Exemplary person who studies the way love others; petty persons who study the way are easier to employ' (*Analects* 17.4).

Confucius' learning is not confined to the ancient; he also learned from his own experience and the experience of those around him. He claimed that his knowledge is based on 'using his ears (*wen*[b] 聞) widely and following what was good in what he had heard; and using his eyes (*jian*[a] 見) widely and retaining what he had seen in his mind' (*Analects* 7.28, Lau's translation).[22] Confucius considered such knowledge derived from experience of a 'lower level', probably in comparison with knowledge that some have at birth (*Analects* 16.9). In allowing for the latter, the *Analects* differs from Dewey's pragmatic conception of knowledge, but such non-pragmatic knowledge is extremely rare and mentioned only in passing; in the text, Confucius and his students were mostly concerned with knowledge that can be acquired through learning. Besides direct experience, people with whom one comes into contact constitute an important source of knowledge. One learned from them by listening to them, but also by observing and reflecting on their behaviour.

> The Master said, 'In strolling in the company of just two other persons, I am bound to find a teacher. Identifying their strengths, I follow them, and identifying their weaknesses, I reform myself accordingly.' (*Analects* 7.22)

Confucius' love for antiquity is also pragmatic. He recommended that his students study ancient works such as the *Rites* and the *Songs* not simply because they were ancient but because of their usefulness. 'If you do not study the *Songs*, you will be at a loss as to what to say . . . If you do not study the *Rites*, you will be at a loss as to where to stand' (*Analects* 16.13, also 17.9, 17.10).

> The Master said, 'if people can recite all of the three hundred *Songs* and yet when given official responsibility, fail to perform effectively, or when sent to distant quarters, are unable to act on their own initiative, then even though they have mastered so many of them, what good are they to them?' (*Analects* 13.5)

Antiquity provides rich resources for dealing with present problems. In *Analects* 7.15, Confucius' student Zigong derived a judgment about a politically sensitive issue of the time by discussing with Confucius the experience of Bo Yi and Shu Qi, whom Confucius considered worthy people from the past. This example of 'reviewing the old to realize the new' is also one of pragmatic intelligence using past experience to

understand the present so that one might resolve a current problematic situation. Similarly, unless our study of Confucian texts, such as the *Analects*, enables us to understand our own current situations and solve contemporary problems, we fail to emulate Confucius' love of antiquity.

Confucius' love of antiquity did not result in slavish imitation or rigid preservation of ancient practices. Confucius was prepared to adopt some innovations in rites even as he resisted others (*Analects* 9.3). He advocated mourning parents for three years not just because he believed it was the common practice among the ancients, but because only children who were 'unfeeling' (*buren* 不仁) would fail to do so (*Analects* 14.40, 17.21). He recommended that, for a state to be viable, it should 'introduce the calendar of the Xia dynasty, ride on the large yet plain carriage of Yin, wear the ceremonial cap of Zhou', rather than adopt the oldest known practices (*Analects* 15.11). To Mark Lewis, this means that 'the Three Dynasties appear not as demonstrations of political impermanence, nor as exemplary models, but rather as proofs of the constant adaptation of rites, and as resources to be drawn on' (Lewis, 1999, p. 109). The culture of Zhou was rich not because it was an exact replica of Xia or Shang (if so, there would be no reason for Confucius to prefer Zhou to them) but because 'looking back (*jian*[b] 鑒)' toward the two earlier dynasties, the Zhou achieved insights that enabled it to create new meanings and values that improved on the old.[23] Confucius cherished antiquity not in the form of what Xu Fuguan called 'low order tradition'—concrete and passive inheritance lacking the capacity for self-criticism and self-transformation (1962, pp. 619–622). What he loved were the accomplishments of antiquity, the intellectual and spiritual crystallization from ancient ways of life, which were not a given, but is in a sense also Confucius' creation because it resulted from his own unique understanding of antiquity; this unique understanding reflectively links the past with present and future efficaciously to foster the growth of experience. Despite his self-assessment, Confucius' love of antiquity and the resulting learning are creative.

That Confucius was creative in loving and learning about/from antiquity is not surprising, since in reviewing the old to realize the new, he displayed pragmatic intelligence. According to Dewey, 'intelligence is itself the most promising of all novelties, the revelation of the meaning of that transformation of past into future which is the reality of every present' (Dewey, 1917, p. 47). In practice, the best Confucians have demonstrated creativity in their understanding, application and development of Confucianism, just as Confucius himself, in his editing, revising and 'putting in order' texts handed down from the past, would have been creative. Such literary labours may seem to lack the kind of creativity found in what is termed 'original works' (which in any case still rely on experience and tradition); nevertheless they require creative interpretation and critical selection, both of which are informed by consideration of pragmatic efficacy rooted in actual experience. The latter is the creativity of pragmatic intelligence, which is not *creatio ex nihilo* or creation *de nouvo*, but creation rooted in experience, linking past, present, and future and therefore fostering the growth of experience. Such creativity requires materials from the past

and involves initiation into a tradition as 'the means by which the powers of learners are released and directed' (Dewey, 1926c, p. 57).

The process of teaching and learning exemplified in Confucius' interactions with his students is creative. Confucius demanded that his students return with three other corners after he showed them one corner (*Analects* 7.8). The 'one corner' given is insufficient to determine the other three without specifying the size of the square: there are infinite sets of three corners that could be offered as appropriate responses. While the implicit requirement that the four corners must form a square prevents the chaos of 'anything goes', the ineradicable indeterminacy of the situation leaves more room for creativity than is usually recognized in the Confucian tradition. Confucius considered himself inferior to Yan Hui because when the latter heard or learned one thing, he would know ten (*Analects* 5.9). This requires making meaningful and valuable connections between the one thing heard or learned, and the ten things known. From a pragmatic standpoint, if the connections are not meaningful and valuable, it would mean that the claims of knowledge are false because the conceivable consequences of those claims would not be efficacious. There is pragmatic creativity involved not only in making those connections, both mentally and practically, but also in recreating in his own way, through these connections, the initial one thing heard or learned. Such recreating is the creativity manifested 'in all forms of life that are not tied down to what is established by custom and convention ... [and] brings refreshment, growth, and satisfying joy to one who participates' (Dewey, 1948, p. 315).

In recreating Confucius' teachings in democratic ways, in revitalizing Confucianism as a pragmatic experiment of Confucian democracy, we embody his love of learning and love antiquity in new ways of life. In understanding democracy pragmatically, we loosen its ethnocentric shackles so that it might engage in truly free and equal interactions with traditions other than those in which it first emerges. Confucian democracy requires more democratic encounters between democracy and Chinese philosophy. Only through such democratic interactions will democracy take root in different soils, grow diverse foliage, and bear refreshingly new fruits.

## Notes

[1] The New Culture Movement promoted new literature written in the vernacular instead of archaic Chinese and new thought emphasizing scientific attitudes and independent inquiry, criticizing traditional Chinese culture and learning from the West. Studies of the May Fourth Movement usually also discuss the New Culture movement. Some argue that the New Culture Movement is one of the causes of the May Fourth Movement; some treat them as synonymous, or one as part of the other; others consider them significantly distinct (Chow, 1960, pp. 2–3). For examples of writings attacking Confucianism during that period, see Chen Duxiu (1960); Wu Yu (1922). Hu Shih's preface to Wu's collected essays is the source of the slogan 'Down with the Confucian Shop' (*dadao Kongjiadian* 打倒孔家店).

[2] On Chiang Kaishek's Fascism, see Eastman (1974, chap. 2). Scholars disagree about how fascist Chiang's rule was. Cf. Hsia (1979); Eastman (1979); Fewsmith (1985, chap. 7); Ding Shouhe (1994, pp. 103–111).

[3] One of the many journals founded in that period was *The New Enlightenment*. Xu Jilin singled out 1984 as the beginning of the 'new Enlightenment' of the 1980s (1999, p. 254). In his survey of contemporary Chinese thought, Wang Hui (2001) held up 'new enlightenment' thought as the 'most dynamic intellectual current of the 1980s'.

[4] On rural and urban protest in provinces and local districts, see Unger (2000); Ding Yijiang (2001, p. 57); Patrick Tyler's *New York Times* report on rural poverty which had resulted in riots in Guizhong in 1994, in Schell and Shambaugh (1999, pp. 357–361). Although the demonstrations by Falun Gong members in 1999 were impressive in number (nearly ten thousand members gathered outside Zhongnanhai, the residence of the Chinese leadership in Beijing), its connection with democracy is at best indirect in highlighting religious freedom and human rights problems in China. Chinese publications have been mostly pro-establishment and brand the Falun Gong as a cult with political motives and spreading pernicious superstitions, although its critics were careful to emphasize dealing with it according to the law, and the need to raise civic consciousness, scientific and cultural standards of the people to resist such cults. One Chinese writer even called on the 'May Fourth spirit' to expose and criticize it (Chen Hongxing & Dai Chenjing, 1999; Wu Wei & He Bingji, 2001, pp. 303–356). For studies in English, see Schechter (2001) and Ng (2000).

[5] For writings on the humanist spirit debate and 'academic norms' debate, see Luo Gang and Ni Wenjian (2000, pp. 3–161, 317–482).

[6] An example of such a claim is found in Chen Yao-guang (1993, pp. 18–22). The practice of democracy is included in Chen's understanding of the modernization process (p. 29).

[7] A few examples of a large body of works, dating back to the early nineties, exploring the contemporary relevance of Confucianism include Huang Bingtai (1995); Fang Keli (1997); Wang Weixin (1997); Lu Dusheng (2001); Zeng Jianping and Liu Xiangrong (2002); Tang Enjia (2002); Lai Ping and Li Lihong (2003); Yang Yun (2003); Hu Jun (2003); Zhang Zhaoduan (2003).

[8] For examples of Chinese writings on Confucianism and democracy, see Zhu Xueqin (1992); Liu Xingbang (1994); Cai Baowen (1995); Chen Hanming (1998).

[9] Besides South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore, South East Asian countries in which the Chinese minorities dominate the business sectors—e.g. Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand—have also done relatively well. Within the United States, relatively speaking, the Chinese Americans have also fared better economically than other ethnic groups (Chan, 1993, p. 39).

[10] Articles debating the relation between Confucianism and Modernization of Korea, Japan and South East Asia have appeared frequently in Chinese journals, for example, Liu Zhidong (2000); Liao Yiping (2002). Monographs on the topic include Rozman (1991); Tu Wei-ming (1996); Yu Mingsong (2000); Xu Yuanhe (2002); Liu Shu-hsien & Lin Yuehui (2002).

[11] At the regional meeting for Asia held in Bangkok in March/April 1993, state representatives from Asian countries boldly criticized the prevailing conception of universal human rights as being too Western, and expressed their intention to set their own 'Asian standards' for human rights.

[12] *Analects* 2.4. Subsequent citations from the *Analects* giving book and chapter numbers will be in the text. Translations of the *Analects* are, occasionally with some modifications, mostly from Ames and Rosemont (1998). A few translations are cited from other translations when I feel that Ames and Rosemont's translation leans too much in favour of my arguments wishing to avoid taking for granted our shared pragmatic interpretation.

[13] In *Analects* 11.25, Zilu questioned the need to learn by reading books and Confucius reprimanded him for being 'glib-tongued' (*ning* 佞).

[14] Other translations of *zuo* include 'innovate', 'invent', 'make up something new', in Lau (1979); Leys (1997); Waley (1996). Ames and Rosemont (1998) translate this passage as 'Following the proper way, I do not forge new paths'.

[15] Cf. Creel (1949, pp. 143–144); Fingarette (1972, p. 60); Ching (1997, pp. 69–74).

[16] The term *zhi*[a] is translated as wisdom or knowledge (wise, know, knowing, etc.). While wisdom, especially in the sense of practical wisdom, *phronesis*, is usually my preferred translation, I shall henceforth speak in terms of knowledge because this translation is neutral to my interpretive endeavour in this article and therefore poses the tougher challenge.

[17] For more detailed accounts of Dewey's social conception of individuals, see Campbell (1995, pp. 38–44); Tan (2004b, pp. 22–29).

[18] The key Confucian virtue of *ren* has been variously translated as benevolence, humanity, and authoritative conduct. My personal favourite is 'co-humanity' suggested by Peter Boodberg (1953). For a more detailed account of how *ren* unites community building with personal growth, see Tan (2004b, pp. 35–39, 82–88). The view that practicing the way originates in oneself and learning must be for oneself is elaborated in the idea of *zide* (自得), 'finding it in oneself' in the *Mencius* 4B14 (Lau, 1970, p. 130). Cf. de Bary (1991) picks out *zide* as a theme of 'learning for One's Self' that highlights the individual in neo-Confucian thought.

[19] This question of scientism is particularly important because some scholars considered it a legacy of Dewey's influence in China during the May Fourth period (Kwok, 1965, chap. 4; Lin, 1979, chap. 5). For an argument against a scientistic interpretation of Dewey's theory of democracy, see Tan (2004a).

[20] This is one of the meanings of culture that Dewey often referred to (Dewey, 1916b, p. 198; 1930, p. 99). Although Dewey sometimes further subdivided the 'culminating aspects of civilizations', including philosophy, politics, law, economics, and sports among the categories of culture, these could be treated as either belonging to science or art or as a combination of the two, insofar as science and art respectively comprises the achievements in the instrumental and consummative phases of human experience. For better understanding of this view of art and science, see Dewey (1925, 1934b).

[21] The Master said, 'I find inspiration by intoning the songs (*shi*), I learn where to stand from observing ritual propriety (*li*), I find fulfillment in playing music' (*Analects* 8.8). On the aesthetic aspect of ritual education and performance, see Tan (2004c, pp. 61–63). Emphasis on the aesthetic in contrast to the rationalistic pervades the work of David Hall and Roger Ames (1987, pp. 131–138), for an explicit discussion of the primacy of aesthetic order in Confucian worldview.

[22] Confucius also associated *xue* with seeing (*jian*[a]) and hearing (*wen*[b]) in *Analects* 2.18. Ames and Rosemont translate *wen*[b] as learning. The character, *cong* 聰, which means both keenness of hearing and intelligence (as in *congming* 聰明), has the 'ear' radical, semantically associating intelligence with hearing. Hearing is also associated with sageliness in the composition of *sheng* 聖, the character for sage, and in Confucius' description of his journey of learning in quest of sagehood (*Analects* 2.4).

[23] The character *jian*[b] is a cognate of another which means 'mirror, mirroring' and often has the meaning of using something acting like a mirror (water, people, besides the usual metallic mirror) to improve not just physical sight, but more importantly, intellectual and spiritual insight. An example is the saying quoted in the *Shujing*, *jiugao* (Announcement on Drunkenness), '*ren wu yu shui jian*[b], *dang yu min jian*[b]' (人無于水鑒，當于民鑒), which James Legge translates as 'Let not men look only into water, let them look into the glass of other people' (Legge, 1960, p. 409).

## References


Ames, R. T., & Rosemont, H., Jr. (Trans.). (1998). *The analects of Confucius*: *A philosophical translation*. New York: Ballantine.

Bao Zunxing. (1988a). Liang'an xuezhe tan Zhongguo wenhua [Scholars from mainland China and Taiwan discuss Chinese culture]. *Zhongguo luntan* [*China Forum*], 312, 53–64.

Bao Zunxing., (1988b). Rujia chuantong yu dangdai Zhongguo [Confucian tradition and contemporary China]. Zhongguo luntan, 313, 27–31.

Bell, D. (1995). Democracy in Confucian societies: The challenge of justification. In D. Bell, D. Brown, K. Jaayasuriya, & D. M. Jones (Eds.), *Towards illiberal democracy in Pacific Asia* (pp. 17–40). New York: St. Martin's Press.

Benewick, R. (1995). The Tiananmen crackdown and its legacy. In R. Benewick & P. Wingrove (Eds.), *China in the 1990s* (pp. 5–20). London: Macmillan.

Berger, P. L., & Hsiao, Hsin-Huang, M. (Eds.). (1988). *In search of an East Asian development model*. New Brunswick: Transaction Books.

Boodberg, P. (1953). The semasiology of some primary Confucian concepts. *Philosophy East and West*, *2*, 317–332.

Cai Baowen. (1995). Mishi de lixiang: lun ruxue minzhu kexue sixiang de lishi bianqian [Lost ideals: On the historical changes of Confucian thinking on democracy and science]. *Qilu xuekan*, 6, 15–19.

Campbell, J. (1995). *Understanding John Dewey*. La Salle: Open Court.

Chan, S. (1993). *East Asian dynamism*. San Francisco: Westview.

Chan, Wing-Tsit. (1963). *A source book in Chinese philosophy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Chang, C. (Zhang Junmai), *et al*. (1958). A manifesto for a reappraisal of sinology, & reconstruction of Chinese culture. In C. Chang, (Ed.), *The development of neo-Confucian thought* (pp. 455–483). New York: Bookman.

Chang, G. (2001). *The coming collapse of China*. New York: Random House.

Chen Duxiu. (1960). Kongzi zhi dao yu xiandai shenghuo [The way of Confucius and modern life]. In W. T. de Bary, Wing-tsit Chan & Chester Tan (Compilers), *Sources of Chinese tradition* (vol. 2, pp. 153–156). New York: Columbia University Press. (Original work published 1916).

Chen Hanming. (1998). Ruxue yu xiandai minzhu [Confucianism and modern democracy]. *Tianjin shehui kexue*, 1, 95–101.

Chen Hongxing, & Dai Chenjing (Eds.). (1999). *Falun gong yu xiejiao* [Falun Gong and cults]. Beijing: Zongjiao wenhua chubanshe.

Chen Xiaoming. (1997). Wenhua minzu zhuyi xingqi [The rise of cultural nationalism]. *Ershiyi shiji* [Twenty-first Century], 39, 35–43.

Chen Yao-guang. (1993). Cultural factors in the process of China's modernization. In Hirano Ken'ichro (Ed.), *The state and cultural transformation* (pp. 15–29). Tokyo: United Nations University.

Ching, J. (1997). *Mysticism and kingship in China*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Chow, T'se-tsung. (1960). *May Fourth Movement*: *Intellectual revolution in modern China*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Creel, H. (1949). *Confucius: The man and the myth*. New York: John Day.

de Bary, W. T. (1983). *The liberal tradition in China*. Hong Kong: Chinese University Press.

de Bary, W. T. (1991). *Learning for one's self: Essays on the individual in neo-Confucian thought*. New York: Columbia University Press.

de Bary, W. T. (1998). *Asian values and human rights*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Dewey, J. (1888). *The ethics of democracy* (University of Michigan Philosophical Papers, 1, 2nd series). Ann Arbor: Andrews & Co. (Reprinted in *John Dewey*: *The early*

*works*, Vol. 1, pp. 227–249, by J. A. Boydston, Ed., 1969, Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press).

Dewey, J. (1891). *Outlines of a critical theory of ethics*. (Reprinted in *John Dewey*: *The early works*, Vol. 3, pp. 239–388, by J. A. Boydston, Ed., 1969, Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press).

Dewey, J. (1912–1913). [Contributions]. In Paul Monroe (Ed.), *A cyclopedia of education*. New York: Macmillian. (Reprinted in *John Dewey*: *The middle works*, Vol. 7, pp. 339–345, by J. A. Boydston, Ed., 1985, Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press).

Dewey, J. (1916a). *Democracy and education*. (Reprinted in *John Dewey*: *The middle works*, Vol. 9, p. 89, by J. A. Boydston, Ed., 1985, Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press).

Dewey, J. (1916b). American education and culture. *New Republic*, 7, 215–216. (Reprinted in *John Dewey*: *The middle works*, Vol. 10, pp. 196–201, by J. A. Boydston, Ed., 1985, Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press).

Dewey, J. (1917). The need for a recovery of philosophy. In *Creative intelligence*: *Essays in the pragmatic attitude* (pp. 3–60). New York: Henry Holt and Co. (Reprinted in *John Dewey*: *The middle works*, Vol. 10, pp. 3–48, by J. A. Boydston, Ed., 1985, Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press).

Dewey, J. (1920). *Reconstruction in philosophy*. (Reprinted in *John Dewey*: *The middle works*, Vol. 12, by J. A. Boydston, Ed., 1988, Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press).

Dewey, J. (1925). *Experience and nature*. La Salle: Open Court. (Reprinted in *John Dewey*: *The later works*, Vol. 1, pp. 1–326, by J. A. Boydston, Ed., 1988, Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press).

Dewey, J. (1926a). Art in education—And education in art. *New Republic*, 46, 11–13. (Reprinted in *John Dewey*: *The later works*, Vol. 2, pp. 111–115, by J. A. Boydston, Ed., 1988, Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press).

Dewey, J. (1926b). Affective thought. *Journal of the Barnes Foundation*, 2, 3–9. (Reprinted in *John Dewey*: *The later works*, Vol. 2, pp. 104–110, by J. A. Boydston, Ed., 1988, Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press).

Dewey, J. (1926c). Individuality and experience. *Journal of the Barnes Foundation*, 2, 1–6. (Reprinted in *John Dewey*: *The later works*, Vol. 2, pp. 55–61, by J. A. Boydston, Ed., 1988, Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press).

Dewey, J. (1927). *The public and its problems*. (Reprinted in *John Dewey*: *The later works*, Vol. 2, pp. 233–372, by J. A. Boydston, Ed., 1988, Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press).

Dewey, J. (1930). The crisis in culture. *New Republic*, 62, 123–126. (Reprinted in *John Dewey*: *The later works*, Vol. 5, pp. 99–110, by J. A. Boydston, Ed., 1988, Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press).

Dewey, J. (1934a). *A common faith*. New Haven: Yale University Press. (Reprinted in *John Dewey*: *The later works*, Vol. 9, pp. 1–58, by J. A. Boydston, Ed., 1989, Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press).

Dewey, J. (1934b). *Art as experience*. London: Allen and Unwin. (Reprinted in *John Dewey*: *The later works*, Vol. 10, by J. A. Boydston, Ed., 1989, Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press).

Dewey, J. (1935). *Liberalism and social action*. New York: G.P. Putnam. (Reprinted in *John Dewey*: *The later works*, Vol. 11, pp. 1–65, by J. A. Boydston, Ed., 1991, Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press).

Dewey, J. (1938). *Democracy and education in the world today*. New York: Society for Ethical Culture. (Reprinted in *John Dewey*: *The later works*, Vol. 13, pp. 294–303, by J. A. Boydston, Ed., 1991, Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press).

Dewey, J. (1939a). The economic basis of the new society. In J. Ratner (Ed.), *Intelligence in the modern world*. New York: Modern Library. (Reprinted in *John Dewey*: *The later works*, Vol. 13, pp. 309–322, by J. A. Boydston, Ed., 1991, Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press).

Dewey, J. (1939b). Creative democracy—The task before us. (Reprinted in *John Dewey*: *The later works*, Vol. 14, pp. 224–230, by J. A. Boydston, Ed., 1991, Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press).
Dewey, J. (1948). Foreword. In *The unfolding of artistic activity*. (Reprinted in *John Dewey*: *The later works*, Vol. 15, pp. 315–317, by J. A. Boydston, Ed., 1991, Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press).
Dewey, J. (1949). Has philosophy a future? *Proceedings of the tenth International Congress of Philosophy* (pp. 108–116). Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Co. (Reprinted in *John Dewey*: *The later works*, Vol. 16, pp. 358–368, by J. A. Boydston, Ed., 1991, Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press).
Diamond, L., & Myers, R. H. (Eds.). (2000). *Elections and democracy in greater China*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Ding Shouhe. (1994). *Minzhu kexue zai Zhongguo de mingyun* [The fate of democracy and science in China] (pp. 103–111). Hong Kong: Zhonghua shuju.
Ding Yijiang., (2001). *Chinese democracy after Tiananmen*. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press.
Eastman, L. (1974). *The abortive revolution: China under nationalist rule 1927–37*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Eastman, L. (1979). 'Fascism' and modern China: A rejoinder. *China Quarterly*, *80*, 838–842.
Fang Keli. (1997). *Xiandai xinruxue yu Zhongguo xiandai hua* [Modern new Confucianism and China's modernization]. Tianjin: Tianjin renmin chubanshe.
Fewsmith, J. (1985). *Party, state, and local elites in Republican China: Merchant organizations and politics in Shanghai 1890–1930*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
Fingarette, H. (1972). *Confucius: The secular as sacred*. New York: Harper & Row.
Gan Yang. (1986). Chuantong, shijianxing yu weilai [Tradition, temporality, and the future]. *Dushu*, 2, 3–10.
Gao Xuguang. (1988). Lun chuantong guannian [On traditional ideas]. *Zhongguo luntan*, 311, 11–15.
Gilley, B. (2004). *China's democratic future*. New York: Columbia University Press.
Graham, A. C. (1986). *Chuang-tzu: The inner chapters*. London: Unwin.
Hall, D., & Ames, R. (1987). *Thinking through Confucius*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
Hall, D., & Ames, R. (1999). *Democracy of the dead*. La Salle: Open Court.
He Yi. (1995). Quntixing jingshen taowang [Collective spiritual escapism]. *Wenyi zhengming* [Debates on literature and art], 3, 25–31.
Hsia, M. C. (1979). 'Fascism' and modern China. *China Quarterly*, *79*, 553–567.
Hu Jun. (2003). Rujia 'chengxin' sixiang yu zhengfu gongwuyuan zhiye daode jianshe [Confucian thought on 'sincerity and trustworthiness' and building the professional ethics of civil servants]. *Yunnan xingzheng xueyuan xuebao*, 3, 57–59.
Hu Shaohua., (2000). *Explaining Chinese democratization*. Westport: Praeger.
Huang Bingtai. (1995). *Ruxue yu xiandaihua* [Confucianism and modernization]. Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe.
Huntington, S. (1996). Democracy's Third Wave. In L. Diamond & M. F. Plattner (Eds.), *The global resurgence of democracy* (pp. 3–25). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Kahn, H. (1979). *World economic development 1979 and beyond*. New York: Morrow Quill.
Kwok, D. (1965). *Scientism in Chinese thought 1900–1950*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Lai Ping, & Li Lihong. (2003). Rujia jiaoyu sixiang jiqi xiandai qishi [Confucian educational thought and its modern implications]. ! *Huahua xueyuan xuebao*, *22*(1), 80–82.
Lau, D. C. (Trans.). (1970). *Mencius*. London: Penguin.
Lau, D. C. (Trans.). (1979). *Confucius*: *The analects*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Legge, J. (1960). *The Chinese classics* (Vol. 3, pp. 399–412). Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press.

Lewis, M. E. (1999). *Writing and authority in early China*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
Leys, S. (Trans.). (1997). *The Analects of Confucius*. New York: Norton & Co.
Li, C. (1999). *The Tao encounters the West*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
Li Shenzhi. (1992). Zhongguo zhexue yu ershiyi shiji [Chinese philosophy and the twenty-first century]. *Ershiyi shiji* [Twenty-first Century], 12, 5–7.
Li Tieying. (2001). *Lun minzhu* [On democracy]. Beijing: Renmin chubanshe.
Li Zehou. (1996). *Zhongguo gudai sixiang shi lun* [History of ancient Chinese thought]. Taipei: Sanmin shuju.
Li Zehou. (1999). *Zhongguo xiandai sixiangshi lun* [On the history of contemporary Chinese thought]. Hefei: Anhui wenyi chubanshe.
Liao Yiping. (2002). Xinjiapo xiandaihua yu rujia sixiang de chuangxin [Singapore's modernization and the innovation of Confucian thought]. *Lilun yu gaige* [Theory and Reform], 1, 97–99.
Lin, Yu-sheng. (1979). *The crisis of Chinese consciousness: Radical antitraditionalism in China*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
Liu Shu-hsien. (1992). *Rujia sixiang yu xiandaihua* [Confucian thought and modernization] (Jing haifeng, Ed.). Bejing: Chinese Broadcasting and TV Publishing House.
Liu Shu-hsien, & Lin Yuehui. (2002). *Xiandai Rujia yu Dongya Wenming* [Modern Confucianism and East Asian civilization]. Taipei: Academia Sinica.
Liu Xiaobo. (1988). *Xuanzhe de pipan* [Critique of choice]. Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe.
Liu Xiaofeng. (1991). *Zou xiang shizijia de zhenli* [*Toward the truth of the cross*]. Taipei: Fengyun zhidai chubanshe.
Liu Xingbang. (1994). Rujia minben zhuyi jiazhiguan yu jindai minzhu zhuyi [Confucian 'people as basis' value system and modern democracy]. *Wuyi daxue xuebao*, *8*(2), 21–25.
Liu Zhidong. (2000). Lun rujia wenhua dui Hanguo jueqi de yingxiang [The influence of Confucian culture on the rise of Korea]. *Liaoning daxue xuebao*, *28*(4), 82–85.
Lu Dusheng. (2001). Rujia xueshuo yu Zhongguo xiandaihua jincheng [Confucian teachings and the progress of China's modernization]. *Zhongyang shehui zhuyi xueyuan xuebao*, *108*, 54–57.
Luo Gang, & Ni Wenjian (Eds.). (2000). *Jiushi niandai sixiang wenxuan* [Collected essays of 1990s thought] (pp. 317–482). Nanning: Guangxi renmin chubanshe.
Ma Zhenduo, *et al.* (1999). *Rujia wenming* [Confucian civilization]. Beijing: Chinese Social Sciences Press.
Ng, P. Tze-ming. (2000). From ideological Marxism to moderate pragmatism—Religious policy in China at the turn of the century. In Chung-ming Lau & Jianfa Shen (Eds.), *China review 2000* (pp. 405–422). Hong Kong: Chinese University Press.
Onuma, Y. (1996). *In quest of intercivilizational human rights* (Center for Asian Pacific Affairs Occasional Paper No. 2). San Francisco: Center for Asian Pacific Affairs.
Pang Pu. (1978). Kongzi sixiang de zai pingjia [Revaluation of Confucius' thought]. *Guangming Daily*, August 12, p. 2.
Pye, L. (1985). *Asian power and politics*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.
Reiss, H. (Ed.). (1991). *Kant*: *Political writings* (H. B. Nisbet, Trans., 2nd ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rosemont, H. (1998). Human rights: A bill of worries. In W. T. de Bary & Tu Wei-ming (Eds.), *Confucianism and human rights* (pp. 54–66). New York: Columbia University Press.
Rozman, G. (Ed.). (1991). *The East Asian region*: *Confucian heritage and its modern adaptation*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Scalapino, R. (1998). Current trends and future prospects. *Journal of Democracy*, *January*, *9*(1), 35–40.
Schechter, D. (2001). Falun Gong's challenge to China: Spiritual practice or 'evil cult'? New York: Akashic Books.
Schell, O., & Shambaugh, D. (Eds.). (1999). *The China reform reader*. New York: Vintage Books.

Sheng Hong. (1993). Zhongguo xianqin zhexue he xiandai zhidu zhuyi [Pre-Qin Chinese philosophy and modern institutionalism]. In *Sheng Hong ji* [Collected essays of Sheng Hong] (pp. 230–254). Harbin: Heilongjiang jiaoyu chubanshe.

Shi Tianjian. (2001). Cultural values and democracy in the People's Republic of China. In L. Diamond & R. H. Myers (Eds.), *Elections and democracy in greater China* (pp. 176–195). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Song Xianlin. (2003). Reconstructing the Confucian ideal in 1980s China. In J. Makeham (Ed.), *New Confucianism*: *A critical examination* (pp. 81–104). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Song Zhongfu, *et al*. (1991). *Ruxue zai xiandai Zhongguo*. Zhengzhou: Zhongzhou guji chubanshe.

Starr, J. (2001). Prospects for a democratic China within 10 years. *Washington Journal of Modern China, Spring*, 65–74.

Su, Xiaokang. (Ed.). (1992). *Cong wusi dao Heshang* [From May Fourth to the river elegy]. Taipei: Fengyun shidai chuban.

Tan, S.-h., (2004a). China's pragmatist experiment in democracy: Hu Shih's pragmatism and Dewey's influence in China. In R. Shusterman (Ed.), *The range of pragmatism and the limits of philosophy* (pp. 43–62). Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.

Tan, S.-h., (2004b). *Confucian democracy*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Tan, S.-h. (2004c). From cannibalism to empowerment: An *Analects*-inspired attempt to balance community and liberty. *Philosophy East and West*, 54(1), 52–70.

Tang Enjia. (2002). Kongzi rujia sixiang dui Zhongguo Xiandaihua de gongxian [The contributions of Confucian thought to China's modernization]. *Chuanshan xuekan*, 1, 98–100.

Tang Yijie. (1995). 'Wenhua re' yu 'guoxue re' ['Culture craze' and 'national studies craze']. *Ershiyi shiji* [Twenty-first Century], 31, 32–35.

Tu Wei-ming. (1984). *Confucian ethics today*: *The Singapore challenge*. Singapore: Curriculum Development Institute.

Tu Wei-ming., (1986). Toward a third epoch of Confucian humanism. In I. Eber, (Ed.), *Confucianism: The dynamics of tradition* (pp. 3–21). New York: Macmillan.

Tu Wei-ming. (Ed.). (1996). Confucian traditions in East Asian modernity: Moral education and economic culture in Japan and the four mini dragons. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Unger, J. (2000). Power, patronage, and protest in rural China. In T. White (Ed.), *China briefing 2000* (pp. 71–94). Armonk: M.E. Sharpe.

Wakeman, F. Jr. (1997). A revisionist view of the Nanjing decade: Confucian fascism. *China Quarterly*, *150*, 395–432.

Waley, A. (Trans.). (1996). *Confucius*: *The Analects*. Ware, Hertfordshire: Wordsworth.

Wang Hui. (2001). Dangdai Zhongguo de Sixiang Zhuangkuang yu Xiandaixing Wenti [Contemporary Chinese thought and the question of modernity]. In Xudong Zhang (Ed.), *Whither China*? *Intellectual politics in contemporary China* (pp. 161–198). Durham: Duke University.

Wang Hui., (2003). The new criticism. In Chaohua Wang (Ed.), *One China, many paths* (pp. 55–86). New York: Verso.

Wang Weixin. (1997). Shilun rujia wenhua yu aolinpike jingshen de jiehe yu chongtu [Unity and clash between Confucian culture and olympic spirit]. *Nanjing tiyu xueyuan xuebao*, *11*(4), 1–4.

Winckler, E. A. (Ed.). (1999). *Transition from communism in China*. Boulder: Lynne Reinner.

Wu Wei, & He Bingji. (Eds.). (2001). '*Falun gong*' *xianxiang pingxi* [Critical analyses of 'Falun Gong' phenomenon]. Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe.

Wu Yu. (1922). *Wu Yu wenlu* [Collected essays]. Shanghai: Oriental Press.

Xu, B. (1999). *Disenchanted democracy: Chinese cultural criticism after 1989*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Xu Fuguan. (1962). *Lun chuantong* [On tradition]. In Huang Kejian & Lin Shaomin (Eds.) (1993), *Xu Fuguan ji* [Collected writings of Xu Fuguan] (pp. 617–627). Beijing: Qunyan chubanshe.

Xu Jilin. (1999). *Ling yizhong qimeng* [Another kind of enlightenment]. Guangzhou: Huacheng chubanshe.

Xu Xing. (2002). Zhongguo yi zai yanbian zhong [China is already evolving]. *Kaifang*, *May*, 24–7.
Xu Yuanhe. (2002). *Rujia sixiang yu Dongya shehui fazhan moshi* [Confucian thought and East Asian social development model]. Nanning: Guangxi renmin chubanshe.
Yan Jiaqi. (1990). *Zou xiang minzhu zhengzhi* [Moving towards democratic politics]. Taipei: Shibao chuban.
Yang Yun. (2003). Woguo chuantong rujia sixiang dui jianli xiandai qiye de shenyuan yingxiang [The deep and extensive influence of Chinese traditional Confucian thought on the building of modern businesses]. *Lanzhou shangxueyuan xuebao*, *19*(2), 99–102.
Yu Mingsong. (2000). *Lixiang yu xianshi*: *rujia jiazhiguan yu Dongya jingji fazhan* [Ideal and reality: Confucian values and East Asian economic development]. Shanghai: Kaiming shudian.
Yu Ying-shi. (1997). The idea of democracy and the twilight of the elite culture in modern China. In R. Bontekoe, & M. Stephaniants (Eds.), *Democracy and justice* (pp. 199–215). Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
Zeng Jianping, & Liu Xiangrong. (2002). Ke chixu fazhan yu rujia wenhua [Sustainable development and Confucian culture]. *Hainan shifan xueyuan xuebao*, *15*(3), 61–64.
Zhang Zhaoduan. (2003). Yiren weiben xiuji anmin—rujia zhexue yu xiandai jingcha guanli [Humanity as basis, cultivate oneself and bring peace to the people—Confucian philosophy and modern police management]. *Shandong gong an zhuanke xuexiao xuebao*, 67, 52–57.
Zhu Riyao, Cao Deben, & Sun Xiaochun. (1987). Chuantong ruxue de lishi mingyun [The historical fate of traditional Confucianism]. *Jilin daxue shehui kexue xuebao*, 3, 16–21.
Zhu Xueqin. (1992). *Lao neisheng kai buchu xin waiwang* [The old inner sage cannot lead to new outer king: On new Confucian political philosophy]. *Ershiyi shiji* [Twenty-first Century], 9, 116–124.